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THE CONTINUING CARE EXCEPTION:  IS THIS BUBBLE ABOUT 
TO BURST? 
MONTGOMERY v. SOUTH COUNTY RADIOLOGISTS, INC. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the last couple of decades, the number of medical malpractice claims 
has been on the rise.1  In response to the perceived medical malpractice crisis 
this has created, a number of state legislatures have promulgated statutory 
provisions intended to deal with the problems posed by frivolous malpractice 
actions and exorbitant damage awards.2  Often these provisions shorten the 
statute of limitations for filing a medical malpractice action.3 
In contrast to these states, Missouri’s existing medical malpractice statute 
was already suited to accomplish this objective.  Rather, in Missouri, the same 
statute has been in force for at least seventy years, and has changed very little 
in recent years as a result of this quandary.  Section 516.105 of the Missouri 
Revised Statutes provides that: 
All actions against physicians, hospitals, dentists, registered or licensed 
practical nurses, optometrists, podiatrists, pharmacists, chiropractors, 
professional physical therapists, and any other entity providing health care 
services and all employees of any of the foregoing acting in the course and 
scope of their employment, for damages for malpractice, negligence, error or 
mistake related to health care shall be brought within two years from the date 
of occurrence of the act of neglect complained of. . . .4 
Section 516.105 effectively reduces the number of medical malpractice suits 
because the statute of limitations commences from the date the negligent act 
occurs and not from the date of discovery.  Moreover, this statute has been 
construed very strictly in favor of physicians in order to bar malpractice 
actions.5  While many jurisdictions have instituted a discovery rule, in which 
 
 1. George L. Blum, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Who Are “Health Care Providers,” 
or the Like, Whose Actions Fall Within Statutes Specifically Governing Actions and Damages for 
Medical Malpractice, 12 A.L.R.5d 1 (1993); James Bartimus et al., Protecting Plaintiff’s Rights 
in the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 53 U. MO. K.C. L. REV. 27, 28 (1984). 
 2. Blum, supra note 1, at 1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. MO. REV. STAT. § 516.105 (2000). 
 5. Howard Schwartz, The Law of Medical Malpractice in Missouri, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
397, 430 (1984). 
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the statute of limitations is not tolled until actual discovery of the negligent act, 
Missouri courts and the Missouri Legislature have rejected such a proposal and 
instead have continued to carve out narrow exceptions to section 516.105. 
The “continuing care rule” is one such exception.  The continuing care rule 
refuses to treat a negligent act as a discrete occurrence when a patient is in an 
on-going relationship with a physician.  Rather, the wrong is treated as if 
recommitted each time the doctor treats the patient and fails to find the 
previously ignored medical condition.6  The underlying theory behind this rule 
is that the physician is guilty of malpractice during the entire physician-patient 
relationship because he did not properly diagnose the illness.7  While the 
continuing care rule has been applied in multiple cases to toll the statute of 
limitations against an individual physician, before Montgomery v. South 
County Radiologists, Inc.,8 Missouri courts had never extended the application 
of this exception to a health care entity.9 
In Montgomery, the Missouri Supreme Court continued to “chip away” at 
section 516.105 by expanding the “continuing care exception” and applying it 
not only to physicians, but to diagnostic health care entities as well.10  Missouri 
courts handled similar situations in the past, but chose to not extend the 
continuing care rule.11  Montgomery, however, provided the ideal opportunity 
to extend this exception.  In Montgomery, two years and eight months after the 
radiology services prescribed by his neurosurgeon began, plaintiff Evan 
Montgomery and his wife filed suit against South County Radiologists 
(“SCR”), which failed to recognize a cancerous spinal tumor after reviewing 
three films on three occasions, eight months apart.12  Montgomery also filed 
suit against Dr. Szoko, an individual radiologist working for the group who 
negligently reviewed Montgomery’s first film more than two years earlier.  
The circuit court awarded summary judgment to Dr. Szoko and awarded partial 
summary judgment to SCR.13  The Montgomerys appealed and the Eastern 
District reversed and remanded both grants of summary judgment, holding that 
Montgomery presented sufficient evidence of continuing care by both Dr. 
 
 6. Gerald D. McBeth, Medical Malpractice: When Does the Statute of Limitations Begin to 
Run?, 35 MO. L. REV. 559, 562 (1970). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Montgomery v. S. County Radiologists, Inc., 49 S.W.3d 191 (Mo. 2001). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Shah v. Lehman, 953 S.W.2d 955 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Dunagan v. Shalom 
Geriatric Ctr., 967 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).  Both courts declined to extend the 
“continuing care” exception to health care entities.  However, the facts of both cases made it was 
unnecessary to reach this issue. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 89-107 and 
accompanying text. 
 12. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 192. 
 13. Id. 
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Szoko and SCR to satisfy the continuing care rule.14  Upon transfer, the 
Missouri Supreme Court held that the continuing care rule applied to toll the 
statute of limitations against the radiology group.15 
Before Montgomery, many Missouri courts stretched the continuing care 
exception to toll the malpractice statute in circumstances dealing with the 
physician-patient relationship framework.  Montgomery adds a new dimension 
to the equation: the relationship between the patient and diagnostic entity.  
After Montgomery, one issue to be discussed is whether the court has gone too 
far in applying this exception to a health care entity or whether this a necessary 
change. 
In Parts II through V, this Note will discuss the history of the continuing 
care exception, the policies behind it, its limitations and the extent to which the 
Montgomery holding expands the exception almost to the breaking point.  Part 
VI will explore the implications of the Montgomery holding on patients, 
physicians and health care entities.  Finally, the author will discuss why the 
Montgomery court’s sizeable stretch of the continuing care rule to toll the 
statute of limitations is inappropriate given the longstanding rationale behind 
the exception in Missouri.  As part of this discussion, an alternative rule is 
considered. 
II.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF MISSOURI’S CONTINUING CARE 
EXCEPTION 
The Missouri continuing care exception began in Thatcher v. DeTar.16  In 
Thatcher, the doctor performed surgery on the patient for appendicitis and 
negligently left a surgical needle in her body.17  Following the operation, the 
patient experienced pain and continued treatment with her doctor.18  After two 
years of continuing treatment, the patient terminated her relationship with that 
doctor and began seeing a new physician who discovered the surgical needle.19  
Upon discovery, more than two years after the act of negligence, the patient 
filed suit against her physician.20  The Missouri Supreme Court found that the 
“act of neglect complained of” was not only the leaving of a foreign object in 
plaintiff’s body, but also the subsequent treatment of symptoms caused by the 
failure to discover a needle in plaintiff’s body.21  However, the court held that 
 
 14. Montgomery v. S. County Radiologists, No. ED 77285, 2000 WL 1846432, at *13 (Mo. 
Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000). 
 15. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 192. 
 16. Thatcher v. DeTar, 173 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1943); see also RCA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sanborn, 
918 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
 17. Thatcher, 173 S.W.2d at 761. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. McBeth, supra note 6, at 563. 
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the presence of the physician-patient relationship tolled the statutory two-year 
period of limitations until treatment by the health care provider ceased.22  The 
Thatcher court defined the continuing care rule by declaring that “the statute 
does not commence running until treatment by the physician or surgeon has 
terminated, where the treatment is continuing and of such a nature as to charge 
the medical man with the duty of continuing care and treatment which is 
essential to recovery until the relation ceases.”23 
Since Thatcher, few decisions have provided more depth to the framework 
of the continuing care relationship, nor have the courts set forth any bright line 
rules.  The end result is that the applicability of the continuing care exception 
depends largely on the circumstances of each individual case.  In a few cases, 
however, Missouri courts have attempted to clarify what factors will trigger the 
continuing care rule. 
In 1980, the Western District articulated the underlying rationale for the 
continuing care rule in Shaw v. Clough, illustrating the depth and importance 
of the physician-patient relationship.24  In Shaw, the plaintiff employed a 
physician after sustaining an injury to her cervical area.25  After the defendant 
physician performed a medical test that revealed cervical disease, the 
defendant performed corrective surgery.26  Subsequent to the surgery, 
however, the plaintiff began to experience pain and loss of sensation in a 
portion of the body used as the donor site of infusion material during the 
surgery.27  Plaintiff continued under the care of defendant physician, who 
eventually performed a second exploratory surgery and found that a nerve had 
been entrapped during the initial surgery.28  Plaintiff thereafter filed suit, 
alleging that the physician was negligent and lacking in requisite skill or 
knowledge.29 
In Shaw, the court began its opinion by stating that “[b]y its very nature, 
the tolling exception to the bar of limitation rule rings out with logic, with 
 
 22. Thatcher, 173 S.W.2d at 763. 
 23. Id. at 762.  The court also recognized that a discovery rule was another possible way of 
remedying the situation, stating: 
[I]t has been held, too, that where injury does not immediately become apparent to the 
patient, the statute begins to run in favor of the physician when the injury so appears as to 
put the patient on notice and inquiry and not at a later period when a malignant condition 
develops there from, or the injury becomes permanently fixed. 
Id.  
 24. Shaw v. Clough, 597 S.W.2d 212, 215-16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). 
 25. Id. at 214. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Shaw, 597 S.W.2d at 214. 
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morality, and with ‘common sense’ as recognized in Thatcher.”30  The court 
found that: 
The doctor-patient relationship is in most instances a highly personal and close 
one, encompassing on the part of the patient a basic confidence and reliance 
upon the skills and judgment of the doctor with a reasonable expectation that 
such will be met by a deep sense of obligation and proper exercise by the 
doctor of his incomparable superior knowledge and the dedicated use of his 
best talents and judgment.31 
The court further stated that the rationale of Thatcher stems primarily from the 
nature of the relationship, and that the treatment obligations arising therefrom 
should be considered as a whole until treatment ceases.32 
Almost twenty years later in Weiss v. Rojanasathit, the Missouri Supreme 
Court articulated four ways in which the physician-patient continuing 
treatment relationship may end, thus terminating the duty of continuing care 
and beginning the statutory limitations period.33  In Weiss, the plaintiff brought 
a medical malpractice action against her gynecologist who failed to inform her 
that her medical tests showed the presence of either a pre-cancerous or 
cancerous condition.34  After employing a different physician and undergoing 
another test almost four years later, the plaintiff was diagnosed with cervical 
cancer.35  The court noted that the duty to treat continues until the physician-
patient relationship is ended by: (1) mutual consent of the parties; (2) the 
physician’s withdrawal after reasonable notice; (3) the dismissal of the 
physician by the patient; or (4) the cessation of the necessity that gave rise to 
the relationship.36  Weiss added that absent good cause to the contrary, where 
the doctor knows or should know that a condition exists which requires further 
medical attention to prevent injurious consequences, the doctor must render 
such attention himself or ensure that some other competent person does so 
until termination of the physician-patient relationship.37  In Weiss, because the 
plaintiff failed to keep a follow-up visit three months after defendant 
 
 30. Shaw, 597 S.W.2d at 215; Thatcher v. DeTar, 173 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. 1943). 
 31. Shaw, 597 S.W.2d at 215.  The court found that the relationship between the plaintiff and 
physician existed by reason of the plaintiff’s traumatic injury, and that the physician accepted this 
relationship and the responsibilities that ensued, namely, the resulting treatment for the plaintiff’s 
subsequent right leg condition.  Id. at 216. 
 32. Id. at 215-16; Thatcher, 173 S.W.2d at 762.  While the defendant physician sought to 
avoid the Thatcher rule by arguing that a foreign object had been left in the plaintiff’s body, the 
court explicitly rejected the defendant’s argument by way of reference to Laughlin v. Forgrave, 
432 S.W.2d 308, 314 (Mo. 1968), and distinguished the case from Laughlin, which the court 
noted was not a continuing care case.  Shaw, 597 S.W.2d at 216. 
 33. Weiss v. Rojanasathit, 975 S.W.2d 113, 119 (Mo. 1998). 
 34. Id. at 116. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 119-20. 
 37. Id. at 120. 
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performed the medical tests, and because she failed to return at any reasonable 
time thereafter, the court found that the physician-patient relationship had 
terminated long before suit was filed.38 
Missouri courts developed the continuing care exception in only these few 
cases.  The application of the continuing care rule is very case-specific.  As 
such, the facts and outcomes of different cases in which the rule was applied 
are instructive in an effort to truly grasp what falls within the boundaries of the 
continuing care rule. 
III.  HOW FAR-REACHING IS THE “CONTINUING CARE” EXCEPTION IN 
MISSOURI? 
Although the applicability of the “continuing care” exception depends 
largely on the unique circumstances of each case, Missouri courts have 
nevertheless expressed limitations and extensions on the application of this 
rule.  At this point, it is important to take an in-depth look at the court’s 
analysis in each individual case, as each holding adds a small piece to the 
framework of the continuing care exception.  This part first looks at cases in 
which Missouri courts have extended the continuing care exception, and then 
discusses Missouri opinions in which the court refused to apply this exception.  
Additionally, Missouri opinions involving the application of the exception to a 
health care entity are examined. 
A. Extensions of the Continuing Care Exception 
In Lorsbach v. Plastic Surgery Consultants, Ltd., the Eastern District 
extended the continuing care exception to include post-operative care after a 
physician performed a surgical procedure.39  The plaintiff in Lorsbach had a 
history of breast lumps, and after having several lumps surgically removed, she 
eventually decided to have a breast stripping procedure performed to eliminate 
the risk of breast cancer.40  Immediately after surgery, and for months 
following the surgery, the plaintiff consulted her physician several times 
regarding the unsatisfactory appearance of her breasts and various 
complications from the surgery.41  Eight months after the operation, the 
 
 38. Weiss, 975 S.W.2d at 120.  The court explicitly rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the 
statute of limitations was tolled until damages could be ascertained when the plaintiff’s pre-
cancerous condition developed into a cancerous condition, noting that the plaintiff’s argument 
read “damages” in section 516.105 in a vacuum.  Id. at 117.  The court stated that the word 
“damages” merely specified the type of action subject to the statute of limitations in section 
516.105, but “[did] not alter the plain and unequivocal limitation in the statute that such actions 
be brought within two years from the date of the act of neglect.”  Id. at 118. 
 39. Lorsbach v. Plastic Surgery Consultants, Ltd., 745 S.W.2d 220, 221 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1987). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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plaintiff again contacted her physician, who informed her that another surgery 
had to be performed.42  Plaintiff did not authorize the second surgery, but 
sought professional opinions from two other physicians.43  The court held that 
the plaintiff was under the care and treatment of her physician for several 
months after the operation due to complications from the operation itself, and 
therefore the statute was tolled until the plaintiff terminated the relationship to 
seek another opinion.44 
Almost ten years later, the Southern District, in RCA Mutual Insurance 
Company v. Sanborn, applied the continuing care exception to toll the statute 
of limitations where one physician negligently performed a patient’s initial 
surgery as well as two subsequent unsuccessful revision surgeries.45  In this 
case, the plaintiff visited a physician for an evaluation of pain in his right hip.46  
After concluding that arthritis caused the pain, the physician performed a total 
hip replacement surgery, using a prosthesis.47  Six months later, an x-ray 
revealed dislocation of the prosthesis and a revision surgery followed.48  Two 
months after the revision, the plaintiff complained of pain and swelling in his 
right leg, and thereafter the physician performed another revision.49  Post-
operative x-rays showed that the physician placed the prosthesis four to five 
inches too high, resulting in the shortening of the plaintiff’s right lower 
extremity and a permanent functional impairment.50  The plaintiff filed suit, 
alleging that he was under the continuing treatment of the physician from the 
time of the initial surgery until the end of treatment following the last revision 
surgery.51  The court recognized the striking similarity to Shaw, holding that 
the second and third surgeries were negligently performed revisions of the 
negligently performed first surgery.  In RCA, the treatment was viewed as a 
whole, thus tolling the statute due to continuous treatment.52 
In Adams v. Lowe, the Eastern District held that despite a seven-month 
time span between the patient’s surgery and follow-up visit, there was a 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Lorsbach, 745 S.W.2d at 221. 
 44. Id. at 220-21. 
 45. RCA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sanborn, 918 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
 46. Id. at 894. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 894-95. 
 50. RCA, 918 S.W.2d at 895. 
 51. Id. at 896. 
 52. Id.  The only difference between Shaw’s and Sanborn’s medical treatment was a third 
negligently performed surgery.  Therefore, the court held that Shaw dictated the result reached.  
The court discussed the importance of viewing the treatment as a whole due to the fact that Shaw 
had separately argued that the case be fragmented for purposes of payment by the insurance 
company for damages.  Id.  The court refused to fragment the case, limiting payment of damages 
for only one “whole” claim.  Id. at 897. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1066 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:1059 
sufficient nexus to constitute continuing care by a patient’s dentist.53  The 
plaintiff’s dentist performed a root canal.54  Following the surgery, the dentist 
told the plaintiff that his teeth “would be tender for a while.”55  Seven months 
later, the plaintiff revisited his dentist complaining that his teeth were still 
tender and his dentist informed him that there were some problems with the 
root canal and suggested further surgery.56  The plaintiff then sought a second 
opinion from another dentist and filed suit.57  The court, citing Thatcher v. 
DeTar, stated that the continuing care exception applied to treatment that is 
essential to recovery.58  Because the dentist did not terminate care with the 
plaintiff, the court held that the plaintiff’s claim was timely.59 
In another surgery-related case, Reynolds v. Dennison, the plaintiff 
prevailed in applying the continuing care exception to toll the statute of 
limitations against a physician who negligently performed sinus surgery to 
remove the plaintiff’s nasal polyps.60  Nearly one year later, the plaintiff was 
admitted to the hospital with meningitis, where a hospital physician called the 
plaintiff’s physician to examine the patient, and to look for a complication 
from the previous surgery.61  While the plaintiff’s physician did not discover 
any sinus leakage as a result of the surgery he performed, another physician 
did detect it and subsequently corrected it.62  The plaintiff filed suit against his 
physician alleging negligent performance of the nasal polyp surgery.63  The 
court noted that “treatment” includes measures necessary for the physical well-
being of the patient.64  The court found that the plaintiff and his physician had 
agreed to continue their relationship through “complications,” and even though 
the physician did not detect the problems and was, therefore, unaware that any 
existed, the relationship had not been terminated by either party.65  Therefore, 
the continuing care exception applied and the plaintiff’s suit was not time-
barred. 
 
 53. Adams v. Lowe, 949 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). 
 54. Id. at 110. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Adams, 949 S.W.2d at 110 (citing Thatcher v. DeTar, 173 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. 1943)). 
 59. Adams, 949 S.W.2d at 111.  The court rejected the defendant dentist’s argument that this 
case was similar to Swallows v. Weathers, 915 S.W.2d 763, 764 (Mo. 1996), holding that 
Swallows was not applicable, as the “continuing course of treatment theory was untimely 
presented and thus not considered by either the trial court or the supreme court [in Swallows].”  
Adams, 949 S.W.2d at 111. 
 60. Reynolds v. Dennison, 981 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
 61. Id. at 643. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 642. 
 64. Reynolds, 981 S.W.2d at 642 n.1. 
 65. Id. at 643. 
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B. Missouri’s Refusal to Apply the Continuing Care Exception 
The Western District, in Shroyer v. McCarthy, refused to extend the 
continuing care rule to toll the statute of limitations during the plaintiff’s 
attempts, or failed attempts, to discover the identity of his allegedly negligent 
treating physician.66  In Shroyer, the plaintiff filed suit, alleging that he 
sustained burns on his wrist and was permanently injured when his employer’s 
physician improperly and negligently operated an electrical muscle stimulation 
unit.67  The plaintiff raised the issue of identity of the treating physician more 
than two years after the date of the alleged injury during a hearing on the 
employer’s motion to dismiss.68  At that hearing, the name of the allegedly 
negligent physician was revealed to the plaintiff and, thereafter, the plaintiff 
added the physician as a defendant.69  The court, strictly applying Thatcher’s 
continuing care rule,70 held that the date upon which the plaintiff sustained 
burns from the physician’s allegedly negligent act was the only occurrence of 
negligence complained of and, therefore, the date on which the physician’s 
treatment of the plaintiff ceased.71  Because treatment did not continue past the 
date of the negligent occurrence, which was more than two years prior to the 
plaintiff adding the physician as a defendant, the suit was barred.72 
In 1995, the Western District, in Kamerick v. Dorman, held that a 
telephone conversation after the last date of medical services rendered did not 
rise to the level of medical care, services or treatment required to trigger the 
continuing care exception.73  The plaintiff in Kamerick sought treatment with 
her physician from 1983 through mid-1987, and discovered she was suffering 
from carcinoma in late 1987.74  The plaintiff alleged failure to timely diagnose 
the condition and failure to timely refer the plaintiff to a specialist who could 
 
 66. Shroyer v. McCarthy, 769 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). 
 67. Id. at 157. 
 68. Id. at 157-58. Although the defendant physician remained employed by Ford, also the 
plaintiff’s employer, for almost one year after the date of his alleged injury, the plaintiff failed to 
add the defendant physician to the lawsuit until approximately two years later.  Id. 
 69. Id. at 158. 
 70. Id. at 161. 
 71. Shroyer, 769 S.W.2d at 160. 
 72. Id.  The plaintiff also unsuccessfully argued that section 516.100 applied, requiring the 
statute of limitations to commence when damages were capable of ascertainment.  The court 
noted that the Missouri Supreme Court had rejected a similar suggestion in Laughlin, holding that 
the specific statute pertaining to medical malpractice actions prevails over the general statute, 
section 516.100.  Id.  “The [Laughlin] court reasoned that the General Assembly deliberately used 
the words, ‘from the date of the act of neglect,’ as an expression of purpose to build into that part 
of the statute applicable specifically to medical malpractice actions a special provision 
independent of, and as an exception to, the provisions of section 516.100.”  Id. 
 73. Kamerick v. Dorman, 907 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). 
 74. Id. at 265. 
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have properly diagnosed the condition.75  While the last date on which any act 
of negligence could have occurred was in mid-1987, the plaintiff claimed that a 
telephone conversation with the physician in late 1987 constituted continuing 
care.76  The court cited Thatcher, noting that the plaintiff was not seeking 
treatment from her physician at the time of the calls, but rather that she was 
merely relaying complaints about the physician’s diagnosis.77  Therefore, the 
court held that a telephone call such as this one, made to a physician months 
after the last treatment, was not sufficient to trigger an extension of the statute 
of limitations.78 
The following year, the Western District, in McCrary v. Truman Medical 
Center, refused to apply the continuing care exception to treatment provided 
by a physician after his recommendation for removal of a painful implant.79  In 
McCrary, the plaintiff was first examined by her physician in early 1986 
concerning complaints of jaw pain, and shortly thereafter the physician 
surgically placed an implant into the plaintiff’s jaw.80  The plaintiff then 
returned to her physician’s office seven times over a six-month period.81  A 
year and a half later, in 1988, the plaintiff returned to her physician’s office, 
again complaining of pain.82  At this visit, the physician recommended removal 
of the implant.83  The plaintiff, however, did not return for the operation until 
her physician wrote her in 1991 to inform her that the United States Food and 
Drug Administration had issued a “safety alert” concerning the implant.84  The 
plaintiff then filed suit against her physician in 1993.85  The plaintiff argued 
that the continuing care exception should apply to toll the statute of limitations 
from the last date that she visited her physician, in 1991.86  The court, 
however, disagreed and found that the treatment was terminated by the 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 266.  The plaintiff claimed that the telephone call created a “reasonable doubt” 
regarding the date of the plaintiff’s last treatment by her physician, citing Ventimiglia v. Cutter 
Laboratories, 708 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), for support.  In Ventimiglia, the defendant 
physician who had treated a young boy for burns had admitted in a deposition that he recalled 
glancing at the scars at a later date.  Id.  The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate 
because the date of the physician’s last treatment had not been ascertained.  Id. at 774. 
 77. Kamerick, 907 S.W.2d at 266 (citing Thatcher v. DeTar, 173 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. 
1943)). 
 78. Kamerick, 907 S.W.2d at 266. 
 79. McCrary v. Truman Med. Ctr., 916 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
 80. Id. at 832. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. McCrary, 916 S.W.2d at 832. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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physician, who recommended removal of the painful implant in 1988.87  The 
court noted that the plaintiff complained of no negligence with respect to the 
physician’s treatment after the recommendation of implant removal, making 
the plaintiff’s suit time-barred.88 
C. Missouri Continuing Care Exception Cases Involving Health Care 
Entities 
While most of the continuing care cases involved a relationship between a 
patient and physician, several early cases, including Shah v. Lehman, Dunagan 
v. Shalom Geriatric Center and Uelk v. Barnes-Jewish Hospital, presented 
opportunities for Missouri courts to apply the continuing care rule in a 
relationship between a patient and a health care entity.89  However, the 
circumstances in both Shah and Dunagan did not support application of the 
continuing care rule.  As a result, the court did not actually reach or discuss 
whether the continuing care rule would apply in the context of a relationship 
between a patient and a health care entity in depth in either case.  In contrast, 
the Missouri Court of Appeals in Uelk, relying on both Shah and Dunagan, 
explicitly held that the continuing care rule did not apply to hospitals because it 
had never been applied to a relationship other than that between an individual 
physician and patient.90 
In Shah v. Lehman, the Eastern District held that a nine-year gap between a 
patient’s treatment and contact with a hospital did not constitute continuing 
care.91  In Shah, the plaintiff’s hips had caused her to suffer for more than 
twenty years.92  Each hip already had been replaced once before the alleged act 
of negligence occurred.93  The surgery in question consisted of removal of her 
left hip prosthesis and replacement with a new one.94  During the surgery, the 
physicians, who were medical residents employed by the defendant hospital, 
placed a cement restrictor in her hip, which was to be left as a medical 
implant.95  Nine years later, another surgeon employed by the defendant 
hospital performed a second left hip revision on the plaintiff and advised her 
 
 87. Id.  The court added, “[P]laintiff did not keep an appointment for April 1988, and she did 
not return for three years. We can hardly deem this continuous treatment.”  Id. 
 88. Id. at 833. 
 89. Shah v. Lehman, 953 S.W.2d 955 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Dunagan v. Shalom Geriatric 
Ctr., 967 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Uelk v. Barnes-Jewish Hosp., No. ED 77114, 2000 
WL 1873293 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2000). 
 90. Uelk, 2000 WL 1873293, at *2-3 (stating that the Missouri Court of Appeals in 
Montgomery held only one week earlier that the continuing care rule may apply to entities and 
therefore transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court). 
 91. Shah, 953 S.W.2d 955. 
 92. Id. at 956. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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that a cement restrictor was embedded in her thigh muscle.96  The plaintiff 
brought suit, alleging, among other counts, that “a series of hip revision 
procedures performed at the same hospital by both its staff members and non-
resident physicians over a several year period constitute[d] ‘continuing care’ 
by the hospital.”97  The court did not explicitly reject the plaintiff’s continuing 
care argument that the claim should be viewed as a whole rather than 
fragmented into only two visits.98  The court pointed out, however, that there 
was no evidence of any contact between the plaintiff and the hospital for nine 
years between the first and second hip revision surgeries.99  Shah held that 
such a large lapse between treatments clearly could not fall under the rubric of 
continuing care.100 
The following year, Dunagan v. Shalom Geriatric Center presented yet 
another unclaimed opportunity for a Missouri court to address the application 
of the continuing care rule in the context of a relationship between a patient 
and a health care entity.101  Dunagan sought to recover damages for five 
separate bone fracture injuries he sustained due to alleged negligent and 
careless acts that occurred while he resided at a nursing home facility.102  The 
plaintiff claimed that the continuing care exception to section 516.105 tolled 
the statute of limitations on his claim until the nursing home discontinued his 
treatment for Alzheimer’s disease.103  The court noted that Shah had declined 
to extend the exception to cases where a hospital allegedly provided continuing 
care over a period of time.104  It did not hold, however, this issue dispositive of 
the plaintiff’s claim.105  Rather, the court focused on the fact that the nursing 
home’s continuing treatment of the plaintiff for Alzheimer’s disease did not 
constitute continuing care for the injuries caused by the alleged acts of 
neglect.106  Because the plaintiff did not allege that he received from the 
nursing home any continuing treatment of his fractures essential to his 
recovery, the continuing care exception was held not to apply.107 
In 2000, the Eastern District in Uelk v. Barnes-Jewish Hospital, stated that 
because it had to follow existing precedent, it had no choice but to hold that the 
 
 96. Shah, 953 S.W.2d at 956. 
 97. Id. at 958. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Dunagan v. Shalom Geriatric Ctr., 967 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
 102. Id. at 287. 
 103. Id. at 289; see MO. REV. STAT. § 516.105 (2000). 
 104. Dunagan, 967 S.W.2d at 289. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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continuing care rule did not apply to hospitals.108  The plaintiff in Uelk brought 
suit against Barnes Hospital, Washington University and two physicians for 
alleged medical malpractice.109  Uelk claimed that Barnes was negligent in 
performing a transjugular intrahepatic portosystemic shunt procedure on 
October 7, 1994.110  Although not pled, both parties agreed that Uelk had 
returned to the hospital numerous times for treatment, including a brief 
hospital stay, and saw many of the hospital doctors.111  The plaintiff filed suit 
on March 30, 1999, more than four years after the performance of the 
procedure.112  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that his subsequent visits to the 
hospital qualified as “continuing care” so as to toll the statute of limitations 
against Barnes Hospital.113 
The Eastern District court in Uelk cited both Dunagan and Shah for the 
principle that the continuing care exception applies only to individual 
physicians, and not to hospitals or other health care facilities.114  The court 
added that 
unlike an individual physician, who once having undertaken a course of 
treatment, may not abandon the treatment until the treatment is completed or 
reasonable provisions for its completion are provided, a medical institution 
does not have any control over a particular patient and does not know whether 
a patient will return to the institution at a later date.115 
The Eastern District recognized that no Missouri court had ever held the 
continuing care exception applicable to hospitals in the past, and it would not 
apply it in Uelk.116  Uelk argued that in this era of specialized health care, there 
are no policy reasons for not applying the continuing care doctrine to hospitals 
providing health care.117  The court did not explicitly reject this argument, but 
noted that this was a matter for the supreme court or legislature to address.118  
Uelk thereafter transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court, adding that 
the Eastern District had also just transferred Montgomery, dealing with the 
same issue.119 
 
 108. Uelk v. Barnes-Jewish Hosp., No. ED 77114, 2000 WL 1873293, at *2-3 (Mo. Ct. App. 
Dec. 26, 2000). 
 109. Id. at *1. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Uelk, 2000 WL 1873293, at *1. 
 114. Id. at *2. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Uelk, 2000 WL 1873293, at *2. 
 119. Id. at *3. 
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While the courts in both Dunagan and Shah did not hold health care 
entities liable, the continuing care doctrine could not have applied in those 
circumstances.120  Similarly, the Uelk court stated that it was unwilling to 
apply the continuing care rule to a health care entity absent supreme court 
precedent.121  Many other jurisdictions, however, have applied a “continuing 
treatment” rule in the context of a relationship between a patient and a health 
care entity that is not the patient’s primary care physician, thus paving the way 
for the Montgomery holding.122 
IV.  OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ APPROACHES: CAN DIAGNOSTIC SERVICES 
CONSTITUTE CONTINUING TREATMENT? 
Several jurisdictions, including New York, Wyoming, Delaware and South 
Dakota, applied the “continuing treatment” rule to health providers in 
circumstances similar to the facts in Montgomery.  These jurisdictions have 
primarily focused on the fact that the services rendered by health care 
providers are of substantial underlying importance to the treating doctor. 
As far back as 1975, New York recognized treatment by a diagnostic 
health care entity as constituting “continuing care.”123  In Fonda v. Paulsen, an 
independent pathologist read the plaintiff’s biopsies on two occasions, thirty-
two months apart.124  Fonda held, “we are of the opinion that to hold [the 
defendant pathologist] as having ‘treated’ plaintiff only at the times of his 
biopsy diagnoses is to take a view of the case which is analogous to the 
outworn theories under which privity of contract was required before liability 
could ensue.”125  The court noted that the nature of a pathologist’s work is such 
that he rarely has any direct physician-patient contact.126  The physician, 
therefore, never treats patients in the conventional sense.127  However, the 
court afforded greater weight to the plaintiff’s argument that a pathologist’s 
work is often the basis upon which the attending physician makes decisions as 
to subsequent treatments.128  Fonda turned on the issues of foreseeability and 
reliance.  The court held that where the pathologist should have reasonably 
expected that other practitioners would rely on his work in determining the 
mode of the patient’s treatment, constructive participation in the treatment 
 
 120. Montgomery v. S. County Radiologists, No. ED 77285, 2000 WL 1846432, at *13-14 
(Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000). 
 121. Uelk, 2000 WL 1873293, at *2-3. 
 122. Montgomery, 2000 WL 1846432, at *13-14; see discussion infra Part IV. 
 123. Fonda v. Paulsen, 46 A.D.2d 540 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975). 
 124. Id. at 541. 
 125. Id. at 542. 
 126. Id. at 545. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Fonda, 46 A.D.2d at 543. 
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would be imputed to the pathologist or diagnostician for as long as treatment 
continued.129 
On similar facts, the Wyoming Supreme Court decided Sharsmith v. Hill in 
accordance with Fonda.130  In Sharsmith, the plaintiff had contacted her 
physician regarding a lump behind her knee.131  After testing, her physician 
concluded that the lump was benign, and took no action until the mass 
enlarged and required surgery for removal.132  After the removal surgery, the 
mass was examined by two of the hospital’s pathologists.133  Both pathologists 
determined that the mass was benign.134  The plaintiff experienced swelling at 
the operative site nine months after the surgery, at which point her physician 
requested that one of the original pathologists again review the slides of the 
mass.135  That pathologist thereafter personally assured the plaintiff that the 
mass was benign.136  The plaintiff later returned to her physician, who found 
two distinct masses around the operative site, and sent the plaintiff for a 
biopsy, which showed that the tumors were malignant.137  Upon review of the 
original slides, it was determined that the original mass removed was 
malignant, and not benign as the pathologist had reported.138  The plaintiff 
subsequently elected to have her leg amputated above the knee.139 
The plaintiff filed suit against both pathologists who reviewed the original 
slides and misdiagnosed the mass as benign, claiming that the statute of 
limitations was tolled by way of the “continuous treatment” exception.140  The 
plaintiff argued that her physician’s course of treatment should be imputed to 
the pathologists and the hospital because her physician continued to rely upon 
the misdiagnosis of the pathologists throughout the course of the plaintiff’s 
treatment.141  The court agreed with plaintiff, finding that it was the 
physician’s adherence to the pathologist’s diagnosis that dictated the nature 
 
 129. Id. at 543.  Interpreted this way, the practitioner guilty of the initial malpractice is 
subject to the same period of limitations as those who continued the malpractice as a reasonably 
foreseeable result of the initial wrong.  Of course, a point may come where continuation of a 
course of treatment was negligent in and of itself irrespective of the original erroneous diagnosis; 
at that point, the diagnostician’s constructive continuance in the treatment would have ceased.  Id. 
 130. Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667 (Wyo. 1988). 
 131. Id. at 668. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Sharsmith, 764 P.2d at 668. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at 669. 
 138. Id. at 669-70. 
 139. Id. at 669. 
 140. Sharsmith, 764 P.2d at 669-70. 
 141. Id. at 670. 
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and duration of the plaintiff’s treatment.142  The Wyoming court, like New 
York, emphasized the fact that the plaintiff’s physician relied on the 
misdiagnosis.143  The court held that based on “grounds of fairness as well as 
basic logic,” until the alleged misdiagnosis was corrected, or until her 
physician ceased to rely upon it, the pathologist’s constructive involvement in 
that treatment was sufficient to prevent the running of the statute of 
limitations.144 
The Delaware Superior Court relied on the Fonda decision and reached a 
similar conclusion in Bissell v. Papavastros Associates Medical Imaging.145  In 
Bissell, the personal representative of the deceased patient’s estate brought a 
medical malpractice action against a radiologist who negligently read and 
reported the results of a series of three mammograms performed by the same 
laboratory over a three-year period.146  Each mammogram was compared to the 
others, and each time cancer was ruled out.147  However, the plaintiff was 
diagnosed with cancer a year later and died the following year as a result.148 
The plaintiff claimed that the tests were part of a collective pattern of 
negligent treatment, while the defendant argued that the tests were separate and 
discrete.149  The court noted that each new test required not only the 
defendant’s own analysis, but also a comparison to the prior test.150  Citing 
Fonda, the Bissell court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, 
stating that it raised a genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether 
the mammograms were discrete negligent acts or a continuous negligent act.151  
The court stated that, in circumstances where the pathologist should have 
expected that his work would be relied on by practitioners in determining the 
mode of treatment, it was appropriate to impute to the diagnostician 
constructive participation for as long as treatment continued.152 
In Sander v. The Geib, Elston, Frost Professional Association, a similar 
case in South Dakota, the court came to the same basic conclusion as Bissell.153  
The plaintiff in Sander received routine gynecological examinations from her 
general physician, including pap smears.154  All of the pap smears taken by the 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. (quoting Echols v. Keeler, 735 P.2d 730, 731 (Wyo. 1987)). 
 145. 626 A.2d 856, 865 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993). 
 146. Id. at 857. 
 147. Id. at 858. 
 148. Id. at 859. 
 149. Id. at 864. 
 150. Bissell, 626 A.2d at 864. 
 151. Id. at 865. 
 152. Id. 
 153. 506 N.W.2d 107, 114 (S.D. 1993). 
 154. Sander, 506 N.W.2d at 110. 
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physician were sent to the same clinical laboratory for evaluation.155  The 
laboratory had a process by which it analyzed each of the plaintiff’s slides, 
comparing new slides to previous slides to make a diagnosis. 156  The 
pathologists reported no abnormal or atypical cells in any of the patient’s 
slides.157  However, when the plaintiff later consulted her physician 
complaining of pelvic pain, erratic periods, and tiredness, her physician took 
another smear which revealed cervical cancer.158  After the previous slides 
were re-examined, it was discovered that the laboratory had misread the slides, 
and that cancerous cells had been present three years earlier.159  The plaintiff 
brought a medical malpractice action against the clinical laboratory for alleged 
negligence in reading her pap smear slides.  The trial court found that there 
was a continuing treatment relationship between the plaintiff and the 
laboratory.160 
The South Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the trial court, recognizing 
that the continuing treatment doctrine is “based upon an on-going, continuous, 
developing and dependent relationship.”161  The court refused to take seriously 
the defendant’s argument that information regarding deficiencies in its testing 
program had nothing to do with the plaintiff’s level of trust.162  The service 
provided by the laboratory was critically important to the patient who was 
completely dependent upon the professional to screen for an insidious 
disease.163  Sander, like the previous courts cited above, focused on reliance, 
noting that the plaintiff’s physician relied upon the laboratory’s classification 
system for detecting potential cancer and relied upon its reports to facilitate his 
choice of therapy.164  The court also found particularly relevant the fact that the 
relationship between the plaintiff and the lab was not sporadic, but routine.165  
Furthermore, during the time relevant to the suit, the plaintiff had no contact 
with any other party for her gynecology exams, pap smears, or screenings until 
after she was diagnosed with cancer.166 
While this is only a small sampling of other jurisdictions’ approaches in 
this area, the analysis required in deciding whether or not to apply the 
continuing care exception is highly fact-specific.  The facts of these previously 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 115. 
 157. Id. at 111. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Sander, 506 N.W.2d at 112. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. at 114. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. (citing Morgan v. Taylor, 451 N.W.2d 852, 858 (Mich. 1990)). 
 164. Sander, 506 N.W.2d at 115. 
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discussed cases are remarkably similar to the facts in Montgomery.  In 
addition, the underlying themes present in the courts’ analyses shed light on 
the rationale underpinning the Montgomery decision. 
V.  MONTGOMERY V. SOUTH COUNTY RADIOLOGISTS: EXPANSION OF THE 
CONTINUING CARE RULE 
A. The Majority: A Diagnostic Health Care Entity’s Duty of Continuing Care 
Evan Montgomery sought treatment from a neurosurgeon at St. Anthony’s 
Medical Center in St. Louis, Missouri, for chronic lower back pain.167  In order 
to make a diagnosis, Montgomery’s neurosurgeon referred him for diagnostic 
radiological services to South County Radiologists (“SCR”), St. Anthony’s 
exclusive radiological services provider.168  SCR’s medical doctors specialized 
in radiology.169  These radiologists interpreted films, which were taken by 
technicians at St. Anthony’s.170  When a patient was first referred to SCR, a 
patient file was created, on which an SCR radiologist recorded patient 
diagnostics and information.171  Each time an SCR radiologist reviewed a 
patient’s films, the radiologist placed the film and the diagnostic report in the 
patient’s file.172  It was common for patients to receive additional radiological 
services after the initial consultation.173  When this occurred, the radiologists 
reviewed and compared previous reports and films.174 
Montgomery underwent a series of three services by SCR, each by 
different radiologists at the facility who, when reviewing his film, failed to 
recognize a cancerous tumor on his spine.175  None of the radiologists 
personally saw or examined Montgomery, but only viewed his films.176  Eight 
months after his first service at SCR, Montgomery contacted another 
radiologist not associated with SCR, who immediately detected the tumor in 
his lower back.177  Montgomery thereafter terminated treatment by SCR, and 
two years and eight months from the inception of treatment by SCR, 
Montgomery and his wife filed suit against SCR and its three radiologists for 
medical negligence.178 
 
 167. Montgomery v. S. County Radiologists, 49 S.W.3d 191, 192 (Mo. 2001). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 193. 
 172. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 193. 
 173. Id. 
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Both SCR and Dr. Szoko, the first radiologist who reviewed 
Montgomery’s films, moved for summary judgment alleging that Montgomery 
filed suit after the two-year statute of limitations.179  The circuit court ruled for 
Szoko and SCR, specifically noting that the “continuing care” exception did 
not apply.180  On appeal, the Eastern District reversed the grant of summary 
judgment to both Szoko and SCR and remanded the case.181  Montgomery 
arrived at the Missouri Supreme Court after a dissenting judge transferred the 
case.182 
Judge Duane Benton delivered the supreme court’s opinion in 
Montgomery, concluding that: (1) the court properly entered summary 
judgment in favor of Szoko because the Montgomerys’ suit exceeded the two-
year statute of limitations of section 516.105 and did not fall under the 
“continuing care” exception; and (2) the court erred in granting partial 
summary judgment to SCR because it was a health care entity that owed a duty 
of continuing care to the plaintiff.183 
Regarding the plaintiff’s claim against Dr. Szoko, the supreme court noted 
that Szoko committed only one act on one specific date: the initial diagnostic 
service on February 14, 1995.184  The plaintiffs claimed that Szoko had a duty 
of continuing care to Montgomery based on the fact that Szoko performed the 
initial radiological service, participated as a shareholder with other physicians 
in a rotating assignment system, never withdrew or was dismissed as 
Montgomery’s physician and provided essential services to Montgomery.185  
This argument was dismissed by the court without any explicit consideration, 
other than to say that where a physician only has contact with a patient once, 
the statute of limitations begins to run on that date.186  Citing Thatcher, the 
Montgomery court noted that a prerequisite for the continuing care exception is 
that a patient was under the doctor’s ongoing care.187  The court found that the 
Montgomerys’ allegations were insufficient to show that Szoko’s care was 
“continuing.”188  Therefore, summary judgment was granted to Dr. Szoko. 
With regard to the claim against SCR, the court held that the Montgomerys 
alleged a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether SCR had a duty of 
continuing care.189  The plaintiffs successfully argued that, since SCR was the 
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sole provider of radiological services for St. Anthony’s, adopted the system of 
rotating physicians, never withdrew or was dismissed as Montgomery’s 
provider of diagnostic services, and provided three services over nine months 
that were essential to Montgomery, there was a sufficient relationship to 
constitute “continuing care” between SCR and the plaintiff.190 
Just as the defendant in Shah argued that services should be fragmented 
rather than viewed as a whole, SCR argued that each interpretation of an x-ray 
or MRI was a discrete, intermittent service, so that the prerequisite of 
“continuing care” was not met.191  SCR reasoned that the treatment 
relationship ended with each film interpretation, which they asserted was the 
“necessity that gave rise to the relationship.”192 
The court found that SCR’s view of the relationship between a diagnostic 
service provider and patient was too narrow.193  It held that “the necessity that 
gives rise to the relationship is the patient’s ailment or condition.”194  Citing 
Cazzell v. Schofield,195 the court reaffirmed the long enunciated proposition 
that the physician-patient relationship can only be terminated in a few select 
ways, namely “by the consent of the parties, or . . . by the dismissal of the 
physician, or until his services are no longer needed.”196  The court implied 
that none of these factors were present in this case. 
SCR’s argued that only the treating physician can have a duty of 
continuing care and treatment to the patient, and that SCR’s diagnostic services 
were not of such a nature as to charge it with a duty of continuing care.197  
Montgomery stated that SCR’s argument was without validity, as neither Shah 
nor Dunagan held that health-care entities could never have a duty of 
continuing care.198  The court noted that by invoking section 516.105, SCR had 
already conceded that it was an “entity providing health care services.”199  
Looking only at the text of section 516.105, the court found that the statute 
covers any “entity providing health care services,” without distinguishing 
between different types of providers.200 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. Shah v. Lehman, 953 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 
194. 
 192. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 194. 
 193. Id. 
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 195. Cazzell v. Schofield, 8 S.W.2d 580, 587 (Mo. 1928). 
 196. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 194 (citing Cazzell, 8 S.W.2d at 587). 
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proposition that health care entities cannot have a duty of continuing care. 
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under the factual circumstances in each case. See supra notes 89-107 and accompanying text. 
 199. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 195; MO REV. STAT. § 516.105 (2000). 
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The court recognized that the treating physician must rely on specialists, 
such as those providing radiological and other diagnostic services.201  As stated 
in Weiss, “the doctor must render [continuing care and treatment] or must see 
to it that some other competent person does so until termination of the 
physician-patient relationship.”202  Fleshing out this line of reasoning, the 
majority found that just as a treating physician owes a comprehensive duty of 
continuing care and treatment to a patient, “an entity that provides continuing 
radiological services has a proportionate duty of continuing care until its 
relation[ship] with the patient ends.”203 
Lastly, the court dismissed SCR’s argument that radiologists do not have a 
physician-patient relationship that charges them with any duty of continuing 
care.204  Citing Shaw, SCR argued that its relationship with Montgomery was 
not a “highly personal and close one.”205  The court found this argument to be 
without validity holding that SCR was composed of ten medical doctors 
specializing in radiology.206  While the radiology group’s obligations are not as 
comprehensive as the treating physician’s, “its services are of such a type as to 
charge it with accurately interpreting and comparing x-rays and MRIs for the 
same complaint by the same patient about the same part of the body, three 
times within a nine-month period.”207 
B. Limbaugh’s Dissent: Was There a Sufficient Relationship to Warrant 
Extending Continuing Care? 
Judge Benton’s holding, tolling the statute of limitations against SCR, 
drew a single dissenter, Chief Justice Limbaugh.  Limbaugh argued that 
extending the continuing care exception to SCR was inconsistent with the 
rationale behind the exception.  Limbaugh primarily disagreed with the court’s 
argument that the necessity giving rise to the continuing care relationship was 
the patient’s ailment or condition.208  Limbaugh posited that when SCR and its 
physicians undertook each examination of the patient, neither they, nor the 
patient intended that care or treatment would continue beyond the conduct of 
the examination ordered.209 
Limbaugh further argued that, since the treating physician was “calling the 
shots” as to whether SCR and its physician should conduct additional 
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examinations, and SCR did not have the option or the duty to continue or 
discontinue the series of examinations that was ordered, there was no 
“relationship” to speak of.210  Additionally, Limbaugh focused on the fact that 
while entities, as well as individuals, may have a duty of continuing care, 
radiological service providers do not have the same duty as individuals serving 
in the role of a treating physician.211 
VI.  AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS 
A. Policy Considerations 
While the holding in Montgomery was rendered decades after other 
jurisdictions already extended the continuing care exception to diagnostic 
health care providers, this decision clearly reflects the vast and continuing 
changes that have taken place in current health care practice.212  The Eastern 
District in Montgomery noted that in our rapidly changing technological 
society, there are daily medical advancements and achievements, which have 
influenced both the practice of health care and the quality of patients’ lives.213  
People expect expanding care for the wide range of medical complaints they 
have, and the astute patient realizes that the manner in which health care in this 
country is provided is changing.214  Today, patients no longer go to a single 
physician expecting total treatment, but instead understand that one doctor is 
neither capable nor competent to provide for every medical exigency.215  While 
a patient’s regular physician may prove effective and affordable in many 
circumstances, specialists are integral members of the modern health care team 
and may be more successful and efficient in providing care to patients than a 
regular physician in particular clinical circumstances.216  The Eastern District 
noted, however, that, in spite of the fact that one physician often cannot 
provide treatment in many specialized situations, “patients do expect that their 
primary doctor will refer, consult, and rely on a team of duly qualified health 
care professionals to maintain and treat medical conditions for their total health 
care needs.”217 
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Today, doctors’ expanding caseloads require assistance from other health 
care professionals for specialized care and treatment.218  “Changes in our 
health care system are continuing, even accelerating.”219  Because of such 
changes, patients inevitably receive health care from a diverse number of 
providers, a phenomenon that is only certain to increase with the additional 
emphasis on primary care and managed care.220  In light of these facts, patients 
understand that doctors are no longer capable of providing every essential 
service or treatment.  Patients understand that they will be assisted and 
monitored by professional health care providers as part of a treatment team 
focused on providing them with medical care in all areas necessary for 
treatment and diagnosis.221  Unfortunately, however, even though modern 
medicine involves other decision-making entities such as hospitals and HMOs, 
“[c]ourts have been slow to recognize that these institutions are an integral part 
of the care that a patient receives, and that such care often encompasses the 
‘continuing care’ that follows an incident of malpractice resulting in injury.”222  
Up until the Montgomery decision, Missouri had not taken a step in that 
direction. 
As noted by Dr. F. Ronald Feinstein, an administrator of the largest 
managed care organization in the world, “[t]he fundamental shift required to 
provide both quality and cost-effective care must be to a health care system 
with members acting as a team using a patient-centered model for care 
delivery.”223  However, because doctors so often must rely on specialists to 
provide full medical care to patients, these specialists must ultimately be 
accountable for their actions.224 
The Eastern District emphasized that the court does not wish to encourage 
primary care providers to attempt medical care outside their capabilities, and 
specialists should not be immunized from liability due to the fact that they are 
providing specialized treatment as part of a medical care team.225  For this 
reason, the Eastern District court found that treatment by a diagnostic care 
facility should be viewed as part of a total health care management plan, rather 
than fragmented into particular visits or examinations. 
 
 218. Id. at *13. 
 219. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Preserving the Physician-Patient Relationship in the Era of 
Managed Care, JAMA, Jan. 25, 1994, at 4. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Montgomery, 2000 WL 1846432, at *13. 
 222. Uelk, 2000 WL 1873293, at *3 (Teitelman, J., concurring). 
 223. Liang, supra note 220, at 217. 
 224. Montgomery, 2000 WL 1846432, at *13. 
 225. Id.  “Under this paradigm, . . . the members of the team will represent all the expertise 
required to comprehensively treat the patient so that the right thing is done at the right time.”  
Liang, supra note 200, at 217. 
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B. Montgomery Revisited 
Applying this reasoning to Montgomery, the continuing care rule should 
apply to Szoko as well as SCR, yet the court refused to toll the statute against 
Szoko.226  The majority rejected SCR’s argument that the service the group 
provides is discrete and intermittent, ending with each interpretation.227  The 
court reasoned that SCR’s view of the relationship was too narrow, and on that 
reasoning it only logically follows that the statute of limitations should be 
tolled against Szoko as well.  Viewing the radiology group as only a small part 
of a total health management team, and Dr. Szoko as a part of that group, the 
duty of continuing care should equally extend to both.  Both SCR and Szoko 
were part of that health care team providing continuing services to patients at 
St. Anthony’s.  After all, it was Szoko’s initial diagnosis that Montgomery’s 
physician relied on in commencing a treatment plan for Montgomery.  
Additionally, each of the other two radiologists who viewed Montgomery’s 
subsequent films utilized Szoko’s report to some extent in making their 
diagnoses.  As recognized in Sharsmith, Szoko’s treatment of Montgomery 
continued for as long as his physician relied on that negligent interpretation of 
the film in his continuing treatment of Montgomery, or until the misdiagnosis 
was corrected.228  For this reason, it seems logical that the court should view 
Dr. Szoko’s liability as it views the radiology group’s. 
Moreover, as the Eastern District recognized, SCR argued in Montgomery 
that each service it provided was merely a discrete, intermittent service.229  
This argument is unrealistic, as well as contrary to what the radiology group’s 
own policy contemplated.  SCR’s formal method of reviewing patient 
information on each visit and synthesizing findings with those reported 
previously indicate that SCR anticipated providing continuing care to patients 
on a regular basis.230  Furthermore, most diagnostic service providers in SCR’s 
position, the sole contracted service provider for a hospital, could certainly not 
be surprised to find that the diagnosis they provide to a treating physician is an 
integral part in the physician’s treatment and diagnosis.231  Clearly, clinical 
laboratories provide essential health services in aiding physicians by furnishing 
information that is invaluable to the diagnosis and treatment of disease.232  
Moreover, the improper performance of a laboratory procedure may induce an 
erroneous diagnosis or contribute to the selection of an inappropriate method 
 
 226. Montgomery v. S. County Radiologists, 49 S.W.3d 191, 194 (Mo. 2001). 
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 228. Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667, 670 (Wyo. 1988). 
 229. Montgomery, 2000 WL 1846432, at *3. 
 230. Id. at *13. 
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PUB. HEALTH LAW § 570 (Consol. 1990). 
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of treatment, resulting in prolonged or unnecessary hospitalization, injury, or 
even death.233  Although the services of a physician and laboratory are 
divisible, they act as collaborators, not antagonists.234  The work of a patient’s 
physician and a radiologist interpreting the patient’s films, for example, is 
interrelated, “for the analysis performed by a laboratory . . . bears directly upon 
the course of medical treatment to be provided; a proper diagnosis can 
facilitate recovery while an incorrect analysis can spell prolonged 
affliction.”235 
Additionally, while the supreme court chose not to set forth specific policy 
reasons underlying its denial of summary judgment to SCR, the holding is 
consistent with the rationale evidenced by the Eastern District in Montgomery 
at the appellate level.236  The same theme of trust and reliance on the expertise 
of professionals, found in cases in other jurisdictions applying the continuing 
treatment exception, applies in Montgomery. 
The facts of Montgomery are noticeably similar to the factual 
circumstances in cases from other jurisdictions where courts have extended the 
“continuing care” exception.  Just as the South Dakota court recognized in 
Sander,237 not only did Montgomery himself rely on the diagnostic services, 
but Montgomery’s neurologist equally relied upon the laboratory’s specific 
system for detecting disease in order to properly diagnose Montgomery.  
Additionally, the review system used by SCR in Montgomery was similar to 
that of the diagnostic group in Sander in that both groups reviewed the 
previous reports and films on the particular patient when the patient returned 
for subsequent treatment at the facility.238  For that reason, SCR, like the 
Sander diagnostic group, knew that they were providing continuing care as a 
team to patients who routinely returned for radiological services.239 
The facts of Montgomery are, likewise, similar to Sharsmith.240  Like the 
general practitioner in Sharsmith who treated the patient based on the diagnosis 
obtained from the laboratory, Montgomery’s physician continued to rely upon 
the misdiagnosis of the pathologists throughout his course of treatment of the 
plaintiff, and it was his neurologist’s adherence to the pathologist’s diagnosis 
 
 233. Id.  The court in Calvin v. Schlossman recognized this principle where it held that a 
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malpractice statutory scheme.  427 N.Y.S.2d 632 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980). 
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that dictated the nature and duration of the plaintiff’s treatment.241  SCR’s 
services were essential to Montgomery’s neurologist’s diagnosis, and essential 
to his treatment of Montgomery’s lower back ailments.242 
As the Eastern District recognized, the radiological services provided to 
Montgomery were an essential part of his care without which his neurosurgeon 
could not have properly treated him.243  Montgomery placed his trust in his 
neurosurgeon and in those health care professionals who his neurosurgeon 
involved as part of the health care team in the continuous treatment of his 
lower back pain.244  While Montgomery did not specifically explain the reasons 
for the holding, this rationale comports with that of the Eastern District and 
other jurisdictions deciding cases under similar fact patterns. 
While Limbaugh focused a large portion of his dissent on the fact that SCR 
and its physicians did not anticipate a continuing relationship with 
Montgomery,245 the flaw in this argument is in its suggestion that the care 
provider’s intention in treatment is of the greatest importance to the duty of 
continuing care.  Does a physician or health care provider have to intend for 
treatment to continue in order for care to be continuing? 
Whether the health care provider is a physician or a diagnostic group, the 
patient’s needs should be determinative of whether care will continue, and that 
patient’s needs often stem from the existence of a particular ailment or 
condition.  To argue that a diagnostic group intends to provide only a one-time 
service ignores the fact that diagnostic entities provide an essential service that 
affects a patient’s entire mode of treatment. 
Under the circumstances in Montgomery, where a physician does not have 
the specialized training to recognize the presence of disease in the patient’s 
film, the radiologist is providing more than just a one-time service, he is 
providing a diagnosis that will affect the physician’s course of treatment of that 
patient.246  In that sense, the radiologist’s care is continuing.  His diagnosis, or 
in Montgomery’s case, misdiagnosis, has a substantial effect on the treatment 
scheme that the physician provides for the patient.  The fact that the physician 
treats the patient relying on the radiologist’s finding after viewing only a few 
slides on a few occasions does not exempt the radiologist from continuing to 
be a part of the patient’s health care management team.  So long as that 
physician is still relying on the diagnosis of that particular diagnostic group in 
treating the patient, the radiologist’s treatment does not end until either the 
patient or physician terminates the radiologist’s role as part of the patient’s 
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health care team or until the cessation of the necessity that gave rise to the 
relationship.247 
But, as Limbaugh would ask, was not the treating physician “calling the 
shots?”  Under Limbaugh’s reasoning, a diagnostic service provider would 
never be held accountable for negligence.  Where the radiology group is the 
sole provider of services for a particular physician, and that physician employs 
the group’s services in the treatment of a patient, that group is part of a health 
care team involved in the continuing treatment of the patient.  The physician 
may “call the shots,” but the physician does so relying on the expertise of other 
team members.  Negligence on the part of any one service provider who is part 
of that team can have an effect on the entire course of treatment that the 
physician takes.  Society has chosen accountability as its main mechanism to 
ensure respect for those in the health care field.248  Therefore, all medical 
decision-makers must be held equally accountable for their decisions affecting 
patients’ health. 
C. The Malpractice Statute Should Be Tolled—But is the Continuing Care 
Rule the Way to Go? 
The author agrees with the other jurisdictions that focus on reliance as the 
primary justification for applying the continuing care rule to diagnostic health 
care entities.  It is important to note, however, as stated above, that the 
Missouri continuing care rule first articulated in Thatcher is based on the 
rationale that “[t]he doctor-patient relationship is . . . a highly personal and 
close one.”249  When, if ever, does a patient have a highly close and personal 
relationship with a diagnostic services physician or group practice?  While the 
author agrees with the Montgomery court’s decision to toll the statute of 
limitations, the Montgomery court’s use of the continuing care rule in doing so 
in inappropriate.  The justification behind the continuing care rule articulated 
in Thatcher simply does not comport with the relationship between a 
diagnostic radiologist or diagnostic group and a patient. 
Diagnostic radiologists diagnose diseases of the human body using x-rays, 
ultrasound, radio waves and radioactive materials.250  They generally act as 
consultants to other physicians who are caring for a patient, reading films for 
medical diagnostic purposes.251  Diagnostic radiologists advise doctors of the 
best radiographic examination to perform for a particular patient’s problem, 
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supervise radiographic examinations of a patient performed by the medical 
radiation technologist, interpret images from radiographic examinations, and 
review examinations with the doctors treating the patient.252  Just about every 
area of medicine uses diagnostic radiology to aid in treatment of the patient.253 
Because of the types of tasks the diagnostic radiologist and the diagnostic 
group perform, the relationship between a diagnostic radiologist and a patient 
is frequently anything but “close and personal.”  Often, the diagnostic 
radiologist is nothing more than a faceless specialist acting behind the scenes, 
making conclusions that affect a patient’s whole course of treatment without 
ever having met the patient.  For this reason, courts have found that radiology 
traditionally has not involved the close personal relationship likely to develop 
between a patient and a treating physician in other specialties.254 
Because diagnostic radiologists so often do not develop the personal 
relationship with the patient that the continuing care rule presupposes, it does 
not seem fit under Missouri’s rationale to apply the continuing care rule 
against such specialists.  However, Montgomery likely responded to the 
modern changes in health care by expanding this rule.  The fact remains that 
expanding this rule to include a diagnostic entity that does not have that 
personal physician-patient relationship goes directly against the rationale 
behind the continuing care rule.  However, if the court cannot extend the 
continuing care exception in worthy circumstances, such as those present in 
Montgomery, what other possible recourse is out there? 
D. An Alternative Approach 
While the Montgomery decision will likely have a great impact on claims 
of medical negligence involving health care services provided by diagnostic 
specialty groups in Missouri, the few reasons Montgomery advances in support 
of its argument are less than enlightening.  Because Montgomery did not fully 
seize this opportunity to explain its reasoning behind extending the continuing 
care rule to a diagnostic group, which clearly did not have a personal 
relationship with Montgomery, it may be that this exception has run its course.  
In other words, this decision may be evidence that the court supports adoption 
of a discovery rule. 
Thus far, Missouri courts have repeatedly rejected the adoption of a 
discovery rule for medical malpractice actions, stating that the argument is best 
 
 252. Irirangi, supra note 250. 
 253. University of Maryland Medicine, supra note 251. 
 254. See Eslami v. Eslami, 591 A.2d 411 (Conn. 1991); Patricia C. Kuszler, Telemedicine and 
Integrated Health Care Delivery: Compounding Malpractice Liability, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 297, 
326 n.11 (1999). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2002] THE CONTINUING CARE EXCEPTION 1087 
addressed by the General Assembly.255  The discovery rule provides that a 
cause of action accrues not at the time of the negligent act, as section 516.105 
now provides, but at the time a plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have 
discovered, the injury.256  This is a more reasonable approach since plaintiffs 
are frequently unable to detect the problem giving rise to liability for 
negligence on the date the act occurred, often because the problem may not 
emerge until much later, after the statutory period has run.257  At least twenty-
six states currently have a discovery rule in effect for medical malpractice 
claims.258  These states have given various reasons for adoption of the 
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discovery rule.259  Some courts have declared that the use of any different rule 
would allow an unjust result.  Others have found that it is within the province 
of the judiciary to find a discovery rule when the legislature has been silent on 
the issue and the court determines that such a reform is necessary.  Still others 
argued that the discovery rule must be adopted or else the statute of limitations 
without such a rule creates unreasonable and absurd results.260  Nevertheless, 
Missouri remains in the minority in declining to implement this rule. 
As of the Montgomery decision, Missouri has not adopted a discovery rule.  
Missouri, however, has slowly extended the continuing care exception and also 
has slowly chipped away at section 516.105 through the addition of other 
exceptions, which toll the statute of limitations in specific instances. 
For instance, in response to the court’s opinions in specific cases, the 
legislature has set forth two exceptions, which allow the discovery rule in 
limited circumstances: in cases involving foreign bodies and medical testing.261  
In cases in which a foreign object has negligently been left in the patient’s 
body, section 516.105 allows the action to be brought “within two years from 
the date of discovery of the negligent act, or from the date on which the patient 
in the exercise of ordinary care should have discovered such alleged 
negligence.”262  A similar exception exists for a situation where there has been 
a negligent failure to inform a patient of the results of medical tests.263 
The “Thatcher rule” came into existence long before these two exceptions 
were added to section 516.105, and this rule has likely survived for half a 
century due to its adaptability.  Because the legislature has only adopted these 
few exceptions to section 516.105, and because the legislature has not codified 
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this exception, the continuing care rule continues to evolve as a tool for the 
court to toll the statute of limitations in deserving instances.  The extension of 
this rule to diagnostic health care providers in Montgomery is no exception.  At 
this rate, the continuing care rule may repeatedly be expanded to act like a 
discovery rule.  While this trend could continue, there is at least one good 
reason why the discovery rule is a better alternative and should replace the 
continuing care exception. 
Because the continuing care exception tolls the statute of limitations until 
the patient’s relationship with the health care provider terminates, this 
exception has the potential to create an incentive for physicians and health care 
entities to terminate care at the earliest sign that a negligent act has been 
performed in order to start the running of the statute of limitations.  While the 
Thatcher rationale focused on the duty of a health care provider to continue to 
provide treatment for a patient, it has also been recognized that one way to 
terminate the relationship is by the physician’s withdrawal after reasonable 
notice.264  In a situation where a negligent act has been committed, which does 
not fit into the “foreign body” or “medical test” exception, and the patient is 
still in a continuing care relationship with that physician, the only way the 
statute of limitations will begin to run is through termination of that 
relationship by one of the four means articulated in Weiss.265  The potential for 
harm to the patient in a situation like this far outweighs any danger that could 
result from instituting a discovery rule.  The Eastern District has made an 
“urgent plea” to the General Assembly to reconsider this issue in light of the 
injustice inherent in the current statute of limitations.266  However, to this date, 
the Missouri Legislature has failed to do so. 
Without adoption of the discovery rule, Missouri courts may find it 
impossible to expand the continuing care exception to accommodate every 
twist and turn so as to prevent unfairness to a patient who is being treated by a 
health care team.  The discovery rule would eliminate the problems that the 
court currently faces in trying to stretch the continuing care exception to apply 
to diagnostic groups.  This is likely the true reason why the court set forth so 
few reasons for it’s current expansion of the continuing treatment exception.  
Because of the potential injustice inherent in rejecting the discovery rule in 
favor of the “continuing care” exception, adopting a discovery rule is the only 
way of ensuring that justice prevails. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Since its beginning in Missouri nearly half a century ago, the continuing 
care exception has expanded and changed form to toll the often harsh statute of 
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limitations in many deserving circumstances.  Montgomery is certainly no 
exception.  Because the court is powerless to institute a discovery rule, 
however, this exception has remained the only tool for the court to use to 
extend the statute of limitations.  Dissenters may argue that the Thatcher 
rationale behind the continuing care exception simply will not allow the 
exception to withstand the continual changes in the medical world. That 
argument, however, is at odds with the reality that the state of health care in the 
United States is ever-evolving, with no end in sight.  Although Montgomery’s 
sizeable stretch of the rationale behind this exception should alert the 
legislature that statutory change is a must, the long history of Missouri courts’ 
futile efforts in breaking through to the legislature proves that this outlook 
would be naïve.  Health care’s continual transformation will only force the 
continuing care exception to perform more acrobatics in the years to come.  At 
some point, before the “continuing care” bubble bursts, the Missouri 
legislature must take action and institute a discovery rule. 
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